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ABSTRACT

This Chapter provides a survey of the economics literature on multi-sided platforms with
particular focus on competition policy issues, including market definition, mergers, monopolization,
and coordinated behavior. It provides a survey of the general industrial organization theory of
multi-sided platforms and then considers various issues concerning the application of antitrust
analysis to multi-sided platform businesses. It shows that it is not possible to know whether
standard economic models, often relied on for antitrust analysis, apply to multi-sided platforms
without explicitly considering the existence of multiple customer groups with interdependent
demand. It summarizes many theoretical and empirical papers that demonstrate that a number of
results for single-sided firms, which are the focus of much of the applied antitrust economics
literature, do not apply directly to multi-sided platforms.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Economists have identified a class of businesses that are now generally referred to as “multisided platforms.” Multi-sided platforms create value by bringing two or more different types of
economic agents together and facilitating interactions between them that make both agents better
off.1 These platforms play critical roles in many economically important industries such as payments,
mobile phones, financial exchanges, advertising, and various Internet-based industries. In this
Chapter we will focus on common aspects of these and other platform businesses that have
important implications for firm behavior and competition, but we will also note some of the novel
and important ways these implications differ across firms and industries.2
Multi-sided platforms solve a transaction-cost problem that makes it difficult or impossible for
agents in different groups to get together. In most cases, greater involvement by agents of at least
one type increases the value of the platform to agents of other types. Such indirect network effects
function something like economies of scale on the demand side and increase the value economic
agents can realize from the platform. In a two-sided setting, the chance of finding a value-increasing
interaction depends on how many agents of the first kind an agent of the second kind can reach and
often vice versa. A multi-sided platform creates value by coordinating the multiple groups of agents
and, in particular, ensuring that there are enough agents of each type to make participation
They are also sometimes referred to a “two-sided markets.” We resist this terminology because multi-sidedness is
an attribute of an individual business that may not always be shared by all of its competitors.
2 Over the years, several strands of economic analysis have touched on aspects of these types of businesses.
Economists have understood how intermediaries facilitate value-creating exchange at least since Smith (1776, at 213222). The microfinance literature modeled exchange institutions such as those for equities. See Spulber (1996). The
advertising economics literature has examined the role of the media in connecting advertisers and readers. See Bagwell
(2007). The literature on indirect network effects has considered the coordination of demand between users and
producers of complementary goods. See Katz and Shapiro (1994) for a survey. On the surface, multi-sided platforms
resemble ordinary multi-product firms, but, as we discuss below, they in fact differ fundamentally.
1
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worthwhile for all types.
The fundamental insight that there is a broad class of businesses that act as catalysts for creating
value for two or more groups of customers and have economic features not well explained by the
standard economics of the firm was made by Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole (2003) in a paper
that started circulating around 2000.3 Their main focus in developing an economic model of multisided platforms was on how the relative prices charged to the two sides of the platform coordinated
demand. They showed that the optimal prices—both from the standpoint of profit-maximization
and social welfare maximization—could entail pricing below the marginal cost of provision to one
side and above the marginal cost of provision to the other side. Evans (2003a) showed that there
were numerous industries in which firms acting as catalysts set some prices below marginal cost and
sometimes at zero. These include software platforms, advertising-supported media, exchanges, and
payment systems. They range from the old (the village matchmaker) to the new (mobile-based social
networking).
Since the birth of the multi-sided platform literature, three noteworthy developments have taken
place that are particularly relevant to this Chapter. First, there has emerged a large and rapidly
expanding literature on multi-sided platforms in economics, antitrust, and strategic management. We
have identified more than 150 articles on multi-sided platforms that have appeared in print or in
working paper form since we last surveyed this area in 2007. It is still early in the development of
this corner of industrial organization, and by no means have all important questions been answered.
Second, competition authorities around the world have used the multi-sided platform framework to
evaluate cases and reach decisions. See OECD (2009) for a survey of the how various authorities
are approaching cases involving platforms.4 The multi-sided platform literature is regularly cited in
submissions in legal and investigative proceedings. Third, a number of large global multi-sided
platforms have emerged as a result of ongoing revolutions involving the Internet, mobile devices,
and information technology more broadly, as described in Evans (2008). These platforms have
garnered considerable attention from antitrust authorities—for example the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission’s and the European Commission’s investigations of Google—and private
complainants—such as Qihoo 360’s lawsuit against Tencent in China and the Consumer Watchdog
complaint against Facebook in the U.S.5
Experienced antitrust practitioners know that no two businesses or markets are alike and may
wonder why one class of businesses, multi-sided platforms, deserves a chapter in a volume on
antitrust. After all, grocery stores and copper mines also differ in fundamental ways. Indeed, early
in the emergence of the economic literature on multi-sided platforms, some commentators argued
Other key theoretical papers are Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Armstrong (2006), and Rochet and Tirole (2006).
Weyl (2010) generalizes and unifies the models in these papers. Most of the subsequent literature builds on these papers.
The platform formulation was also introduced in the context of information goods in Parker and van Alstyne (2005).
4 OECD Competition Committee (2009). The first author was an advisor to the OECD and helped draft the
OECD’s report.
5 Washington Post, October 14, 2012; Wall Street Journal Online, November 29, 2012; Qihoo v. Tencent.
3
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that there was nothing new in the economics of multi-sided platforms and thus no reason for
competition analysis to treat them differently from grocery stores or copper mines.
Few hold this view today. The economics literature that has developed since 2000 shows
robustly that many results derived from models of one-sided businesses generally do not apply to
multi-sided platforms that serve different interdependent customer groups. The clearest example of
this involves price. When competition is imperfect, long-run equilibrium prices exceed marginal cost
in traditional models but not necessarily in multi-sided platform models. Similarly, many of the
analytical methods that are commonly used in antitrust matters, such as the SSNIP test or models
for evaluating exclusionary abuses through tying, do not necessarily apply, without significant
adaptation, to industries with multi-sided platforms. Nor do theories of exclusion, such as those
involving exclusive dealing.
An additional reason for a separate focus on multi-sided platforms is that there are important
similarities in the business models adopted by multi-sided platforms in different industries, and the
literature has already identified some important sources for both those similarities and for
differences of the sort that distinguish grocery stores from copper mines. The selective survey in
this Chapter is intended to provide insights from across these industries that readers may find useful
in specialized cases. In this sense, surveying multi-sided platforms is similar to considering
franchises. The economics and the case law related to one kind of franchises or multi-sided platform
are relevant to other kinds of franchises or multi-sided platforms, but in both cases it is important to
pay attention to sources of differences between individual businesses and markets.
As we noted above, some early commentators argued that the economics of multi-sided
platforms was old wine in new bottles: just a new label for industries with indirect network effects
that economists had written about since the mid-1980s. Others claimed that these platforms did not
raise any issues that required significant modification to traditional antitrust tools.6 We have asserted
above and will demonstrate below that the burgeoning economics literature on multi-sided
platforms has shown that there are new wines here—particularly good, complex vintages in fact—
and that one-sided tools often do not apply, at least not without substantial changes, to multi-sided
platforms. Much of the work discussed below is making its way into the interactions among
authorities, complainants, defendants, and courts. And there is more to come.
II.

ECONOMICS OF MULTI-SIDED PLATFORMS

It is useful to start with an example of a two-sided platform to establish some basic concepts.
OpenTable is an American-based company that provides a platform for fine-dining restaurants and
consumers in various cities in the U.S. and other countries.7 It enables consumers to make and
restaurants to accept reservations for tables over the Internet. It helped solve a transaction problem
6 See Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief at 17-24, United States v. First Data Corporation, No. 03-2169 (D.D.C. December 10,
2003).
7 For the company’s geographic scope, see OpenTable Inc. (2011), at 3, 7-8.
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for consumers and restaurants. Consumers used to have to call a restaurant and, assuming they
reached someone, ask whether a particular time was available for their party. If they were unable to
make a reservation, they would repeat the process for another restaurant, perhaps many times.
Restaurants used to have to devote resources to taking phone calls, many of which did not result in a
reservation, and keeping track of the reservations they did take. As anyone who has used both
methods has observed, the web-based reservation systems enable consumers to very quickly search
for restaurants with availability and make reservations at them. Figure 1 shows OpenTable’s view of
the transaction cost problem that it solved.

Figure 1: OpenTable and Transaction Costs

For OpenTable to provide this service it needed to have significant numbers of both consumers
and restaurants using its platform. OpenTable started by providing table management software to
restaurants—a one-sided business. Once it had a sufficiently large number of restaurants in some
cities, it developed a web-based platform for consumers to make reservations that would be
automatically incorporated into its table management software. OpenTable provided this service to
consumers for free. In fact, the price is slightly negative: consumers earn modest rewards that can
be used to reduce their bill at participating restaurants. Restaurants have to license Open Table’s
table management software and pay a fee for every patron they seat who has made a reservation
through OpenTable. As of 2011 OpenTable had 25 thousand restaurants in the U.S. and sat 9.0
million consumers a month. It earned $139.5 million of revenue.8
OpenTable has several features that are common among multi-sided platforms.
First, it has two sorts of indirect network externalities. There is a usage externality: both
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OpenTable Inc. (2011), at 2, 7.
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consumers and restaurants benefit when the system is used to make a reservation.9 And there is a
membership externality: the system is more valuable to consumers the more different restaurants it
lets them access. It is not clear that restaurants benefit from having more consumers use the system
beyond the benefits related to usage; consumers value variety, but restaurants probably do not. On
the other hand, it is clear that the value of the table management software is greater the more
consumers use it to make reservations.
Second, Open Table clearly facilitates valuable interactions between two distinct groups of
agents: consumers and restaurants. The fact that members of each groups value interacting with
members of the other group creates the indirect network externalities and provided an opportunity
for an entrepreneur to create a profit-making platform that could increase value for these economic
agents by reducing the transactions costs they incur to find each other and enter into valueincreasing exchange. Consumers and restaurants were able to find each other and make reservations
before OpenTable, of course. One could even argue that the telephone network was the pre-existing
platform, which generally had no out-of-pocket costs for consumers. But the transactions costs of
using the telephone were nonetheless much higher on both sides of the market.
Third, the price structure for the two different types of economic agents, which determines the
relative incremental profit earned from the two types, is an important tool in solving the
coordination problem between the two sides in order to capture value from the externalities. Most
likely subsidizing consumers increased the value of the platform to restaurants, which resulted in
OpenTable getting more restaurants, which in turn made if more attractive to consumers. Note also
that restaurants pay a fixed membership fee to license the software that enables them to be on the
platform as well as a usage fee when they take a reservation. It is not uncommon for platforms to
charge fees of both sorts. Consumers pay no membership fee and enjoy a small negative usage fee.
This sort of dramatic asymmetry, with one group of agents paying prices below marginal cost, is also
not uncommon with multi-sided platforms.
A.

DEFINITIONS OF A MULTI-SIDED PLATFORM

Before relying on the multi-sided platform literature to analyze a business, one obviously needs
to determine whether that business is in fact a multi-sided platform. Economists have proposed
several definitions of a multi-sided platform; they will generally agree in specific cases. Rochet and
Tirole (2006) focused on the price structure in defining two-sided platforms (which they refer to as
two-sided markets):
A market is two-sided if the platform can affect the volume of transactions by charging more to one side of the
market and reducing the price paid by the other side by an equal amount; in other words, the price structure
matters, and platforms must design it so as to bring both sides on board.

9

This distinction between usage and indirect network externalities was first made by Rochet and Tirole (2006).
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For a business to be two-sided it must reduce transactions costs for the two sides. Because of
indirect network externalities there is interdependence between the demands of the two sides, and
the price structure is used to balance membership and usage to maximize platform value. Rochet
and Tirole emphasize that a business is not two-sided if the economic agents can easily defeat the
pricing structure through side payments.10 In practice, it is hard to know as a theoretical matter
whether economic agents could defeat a platform’s pricing structure. Restaurants could impose the
charges they pay for reservations onto those who make them, thereby negating the Open Table
subsidies. In fact, restaurants do not do this despite complaining about the charges,11 perhaps
because of transactions costs or because consumers would strongly object to such a charge, since
making a reservation by phone is free – except for the time involved.
Evans and Schmalensee (2007a) proposed a less formal definition that captures the key features
of platform businesses.12 A multi-sided platform (which they call an economic catalyst), “has (a) two or
more groups of customers; (b) who need each other in some way; (c) but who cannot capture the
value from their mutual attraction on their own; and (d) rely on the catalyst to facilitate valuecreating interactions between them.” The focus of this definition is on the role of the platform in
creating value that could not exist (or would be much smaller) in its absence. This value is created as
a result of solving a coordination—and transaction cost—problem between the groups of
customers. The generation and allocation of this value between the multiple sides is determined
simultaneously. How much value each side gets determines whether they will participate and also
how much is left over as profit for the platform. The price structure is critical in determining that
allocation.
The multi-sided platform literature assumes the presence of multiple customer groups with
demand that is interdependent in various ways. Perhaps the best test of whether a particular
situation involves one or more multi-sided platforms is whether the multi-sided platform literature
provides useful insights that do not emerge from more standard analysis. In the case of OpenTable
it seems apparent both that there are significant usage and membership externalities and that it
would be difficult to explain Open Table’s subsidization of reservation makers without taking those
externalities into account.
In the remainder of this chapter we distill insights from the multi-sided platform literature that
are relevant to competition policy. Whether these insights apply to a particular entity, or to
competition policy issues related to that entity, depends on the extent to which the entity is a multisided platform. When in doubt it is useful to consult the Rochet-Tirole or Evans-Schmalensee
definitions and to make sure that the assumptions of the multi-sided platform theoretical model(s)
being considered apply to that entity. It is also important to note that many of the theoretical
10 Therefore a necessary condition for a firm to be a multi-sided platform is that the Coase (1960) Theorem, which
relies on their being zero transactions costs involved in side payments, does not apply.
11 Pastore (2010); New York Times, December 12, 2010; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, May 1, 2011.
12 Evans and Schmalensee (2007a). Also see Evans (2003b).
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models of multi-sided platforms are heavily dependent on assumptions that may not apply in a
particular application or, for that matter, in any application.
B.

EXTERNALITIES

Externalities are a key aspect of multi-sided platforms. As we noted above, Rochet and Tirole
(2006) observed there are two types of indirect externalities: usage externalities and membership
externalities.
A usage externality exists when two economic agents need act together to create value. We see that
with OpenTable. There is a person who wants to dine at a restaurant at a particular time and a
restaurant that would benefit from serving that individual at that time. They can enter into a valueincreasing exchange only if they can get together. In practice that means the person and the
restaurant finding each other and entering into a transaction. OpenTable and similar businesses help
generate these usage externalities by making it easier for restaurants and diners to enter into this
transaction. They also increase the value of usage externalities by increasing the quality of the
matches: they make it easier for people to find the best restaurant to go to when they want to go.
It is possible that the usage externalities are positive for one type of economic agent but negative
for another type of economic agent. So long as the net value of these externalities is positive there is
a benefit to facilitating interaction, some of which the platform may be able to capture. Some
advertising-supported media are examples. An advertiser benefits from being able to communicate
with a possible customer. A consumer may place a negative value on seeing ads. The platform
provides a value-increasing exchange by subsidizing the consumer to see the ad. Most advertisingsupported media do this by providing subsidized content to the consumer. Free television stations
buy consumer’s attention with programming, as discussed in Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006).
There is a membership externality when the value received by agents on one side increases with
the number of agents—or some related measure of their aggregate value—participating on the other
side. As we noted above, OpenTable is more valuable to consumers the more restaurants that
participate in the service. Smart mobile phone software platforms provide another example.
Developers of applications value a platform more if there are more potential users; users value a
platform more if there are more applications. This phenomenon results in the well-known positive
feedback loop.13 More agents on one side attract more agents on the other side, thereby fueling
growth.
Yet another example of membership externalities is provided by the entry of Diners Club, the
first general-purpose payment card. At its start it recruited 14 restaurants to take its card and several
hundred consumers to carry its card in Manhattan. Driven by membership externalities, more
restaurants and consumers joined its system in the ensuing months.14 Diners Club ignited. More
restaurants joined to get access to consumers who wanted to use the card to pay and more
13
14

Katz and Shapiro (1985); Farrell and Saloner (1985); Arthur (1989).
Evans and Schmalensee (2007b), at 1-2.
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consumers joined to pay at more restaurants. By its first anniversary in 1951, Diners Club had
42,000 individuals who carried its card to make payment and 330 merchants that that took the card
for payment. By 1956, it was accepted at nine thousand merchants, with an annual transaction
volume of $54 million.15
The platform plays a key role in creating these indirect network effects. In fact, as described in
Evans and Schmalensee (2010), the major challenge for aspiring platforms is to get enough agents
on each side to secure enough critical mass to propel indirect network effects. Platforms generate
indirect network effects, and thus value for the economic agents, through pricing, product design,
marketing, and other efforts to attract agents on each side. Jullien (2011), for instance, has stressed
the value of “divide and conquer” strategies for a startup or an entrant challenging an established
platform: subsidize agents in the most price-sensitive group, then use their participation to attract
agents in the other group.
The presence of these indirect network externalities has an important implication for economic
analysis of multi-sided platforms. For traditional one-sided industries economists ordinarily assume
that demand depends on the price of the product as well as the prices of complements and
substitutes. For multi-sided platforms the demand by one group of economic agents also depends
on the number (or other measures of the size and quality) of each of the other groups of economic
agents that the platform serves. Loosely speaking, the sides are complements in demand. Failure to
account for these demand interdependencies in an economic model renders the results of that
model suspect if not completely unreliable when such interdependencies are important. We will
return to this point when we discuss economic models commonly used in antitrust.
C.

PRICING

Pricing in two-sided platforms is more complex than in ordinary multi-product businesses, and it
depends on the nature of the platform. To illustrate both points, we briefly consider pricing in the
two most basic models of two-sided platforms.
In the first of these models, due to Rochet and Tirole (2003),16 a two-sided monopoly platform
operates with no membership externalities, only usage externalities, and levies no membership
charges, only per-transaction usage charges. The demand for transactions from group i is given by
Di(Pi), for i=1,2, where Pi is the per-transaction charge to members of group i. One can think of the
two groups as merchants and consumers and the platform as a payment system that levies only pertransaction fees. The number of transactions that actually occurs is proportional to the product of
the groups’ demands in this model, so that, as in real payment systems, there is a value to balanced
participation. The platform’s profit is given by

15
16

Evans and Schmalensee (2007b), Evans and Schmalensee (2005), at 54.
See also Schmalensee (2002), where this same model is applied to the analysis of payment card systems.
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where Ci is the per-transaction cost of serving a member of group i.
Let Ei be the (positive) elasticity of Di with respect to Pi. Then Rochet and Tirole (2003) show
that the profit-maximizing prices satisfy the following two conditions:

( P1 + P2 ) − (C1 + C2 ) = 1 ,
E1 + E2
(C1 + C2 )

and

P1 P2
= .
E1 E2

The first of these resembles the classic Lerner condition for monopoly equilibrium; the total
markup over cost is lower the higher is either demand elasticity. The second condition, however,
makes clear that this is not an ordinary multi-product firm. Such a firm would generally maximize
profit by charging prices that are inversely related to demand elasticities, all else equal. Here,
however, that condition is turned on its head: the optimal prices are directly proportional to demand
elasticities. Intuitively, the reason is that the platform cares about balanced participation of the two
groups, while balance has no value to an ordinary multi-product firm.
In the second basic model, due to Armstrong (2006), a two-sided monopoly platform operates
with no usage externalities, only membership externalities, and levies no usage charges, only
membership charges. One can think of a heterosexual singles bar or an academic journal. In the
first example men value the presence of many women and vice versa; in the second example authors
value journals with large audiences, and readers value journals in which many good authors want to
publish. The demand of each group for membership depends both on the fee it is charged and on
the number of members from the other group. The firm’s profit function in this model is given by

Π = ( P1 − C1 ) D1 ( P1 , Q2 ) + ( P2 − C2 ) D2 ( P2 , Q1 ) ,
where Qi is the number of members from group i and Qi=Di(Pi,Qj), i=1,2, i≠j.
This model is formally related to the classic model of a monopoly selling complements. In the
classic example of coffee and cream, lowering the price of coffee increases the demand for cream
because some individuals consume coffee and cream together. Here, however, there are two distinct
groups. In the singles bar example, lowering the admission charge to women will increase the
demand for admission by men as a reaction to the increased number of women in the bar.
As a general matter, the Armstrong (2006) model is algebraically more complicated than the
Rochet-Tirole (2003) model. Armstrong (2006) shows that in the special case where the Di
functions are linear, the profit-maximizing prices satisfy the following conditions:
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Pi − (Ci − θij )
Pi

=

1

εi

, i, j = 1, 2, i ≠ j.

Here εi is the elasticity of Di with respect to Pi, holding Qj constant, and θij is a positive term that
measures the impact of increases in Qi on demand from group j, i,j=1,2, i≠j. As in the case of
complements, prices are lower than they would be in the absence of cross-effects.
Schmalensee (2011) shows that in both these models differences in demand functions can lead
to highly skewed pricing of the sort that platform businesses like OpenTable often employ. Weyl
(2010) explores a general model that has these two models as special cases, and he shows that they
have rather different comparative static properties.
While the Rochet-Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2006) models form the foundation of much of
the multi-sided platform literature, later authors have introduced additional factors in attempts to
produce more tailored models of particular platform types. Hagiu (2009), for instance, modifies the
Armstrong (2006) model to capture features of platforms like video game consoles, OpenTable,
Amazon, or eBay, that serve to connect differentiated sellers with consumers. He finds that the
stronger are consumers’ preferences for variety, the larger the share of a monopoly platform’s
profits that is optimally derived from sellers. He argues that this explains why video game platforms
derive very little of their profits from consumers of video games, who have a strong preference for
variety, while most other software platforms, like Microsoft’s Windows and Apple’s iOS, derive
most of their profits from consumers.
D.

CONSUMER AND SOCIAL WELFARE

For antitrust an important and immediate implication of the multi-sided platform models is that
an accurate analysis of the impact of any platform decision on consumer welfare must take into
account all interdependent customer groups the platform serves. Search engines, for example,
provide value to three distinct groups of economic agents: (1) websites that are indexed and made
available to people through search queries; (2) people making search queries; and (3) advertisers who
are seeking to reach the people who are looking at the search-results page from the query. There are
usage and membership externalities across all three groups. The search-engine platform has to
balance the interests of these three groups to provide value to them and maximize its own profit.
Business decisions that affect the welfare of one group of users are likely to affect the other groups
of users through indirect network externalities.
Another welfare issue concerns the relationship between the profit-maximizing decisions by a
platform and the social welfare maximizing decisions. There are two potential market failures
resulting from multi-sided platforms.
The first one is the traditional market power failure. In the absence of perfect competition,
which is an implausible market structure for platform-based industries, the platform will set its
overall price level higher than is socially desirable. It will earn at least short-term profits that exceed
the competitive level. Since most firms have market power, and many must have some market
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power to compensate for fixed costs and risk taking, the market power failure is not remarkable for
multi-sided platforms. The market power-related market failure is similar to that for a one-sided
firm. The fact that platform-based industries deviate from perfect competition should not raise
competition policy concerns any more than the fact that almost all real-world single-sided markets
also deviate from perfect competition.
The second possible market failure can result from the platform choosing a price structure that
does not maximize social welfare. In the two basic models considered just above, Weyl (2010)
shows that this distortion arises because the platform considers the impact of its pricing on the
marginal users in the groups it serves in order to balance participation, while the impact on the
average users is what determines the effect on social welfare. This sort of distortion was first
pointed out by Spence (1975) in a model of product choice by a monopoly. It arises, in principle,
whenever a firm with market power has more than one decision variable and faces buyers who are
affected differently by the levels of those variables – that is, almost universally. As a general matter,
this sort of distortion has not received much attention from antitrust authorities or others concerned
with public policy.
Possible distortions created by payment card interchange fees are a notable exception to this
generalization. These fees, which primarily affect the price structure, rather than the overall price
level, are paid by merchant acquirers (and passed on at least in part to merchants) to bank issuers
(and passed on at least in part to consumers) and thereby affect the relative prices paid by merchants
and cardholders. There is no general reason why the profit-maximizing interchange fee would also
maximize social welfare. Bedre-Defolie and Calvano (2012), for example, show that under certain
assumptions payment networks will set the interchange higher than would be socially optimal.17
However, determining the socially optimal interchange fee depends on detailed features of cost and
demand structures and is empirically demanding. Moreover, even when there is a theoretical reason
to believe that the socially and privately optimal pricing structures are different, there is no a priori
reason to believe that they are very different – as observed by Calvano (2011).
III.

COMPETITION AMONG MULTI-SIDED PLATFORMS

The typical U.S. consumer has many different types of payment methods: cash, checks from at
least one depository institution, at least one debit card, and several credit cards.18 Most retail stores
accept cash, checks, debit, and credit cards. Each of these payment methods is provided by a twosided platform serving consumers and merchants. In the U.S. debit cards are provided through
platforms operated by MasterCard and Visa, credit cards through platforms operated by American
Express, Discover, MasterCard, and Visa; cash through a platform operated by the U.S. Department
There is an immense literature on the economics of interchange fees, begun by Baxter (1983). In addition to
Bedre-Defolie and Calvano (2012), other recent contributions include Prager et al (2009), Rochet and Wright (2010), and
Wang (2010).
18 Federal Reserve Board of Governors (2010); Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (2009).
17
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of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve System; and checks through a platform operated by the
Federal Reserve System. Some large retail stores also offer store credit or charge cards, which many
consumers also use. These store cards are traditional single-sided products. One can debate which
of these payment methods compete so closely with each other they should be included in the same
relevant market for a merger or antitrust claim—a topic we consider in the next section. But it is
clear consumers and retailers use all of these methods, they all compete with each other to some
degree, and this competition has been going for decades.
Diners Club was able to break into the mature payments industry in the U.S. in 1950 through
product differentiation. There were two payment platforms—cash and checks. Some retailers also
had store cards. Diners Club introduced a charge-card platform that, like cash and checks, many
consumers and merchants could use for payments. Unlike checks, Diners Club guaranteed payment
to the merchant. Unlike store card, consumers could use the card at many merchants. And unlike
cash and checks, the consumer did not have to pay for the transaction until her monthly charge card
bill came due. Despite the advantage that cash and checks had from indirect network effects Diners
Club, and subsequent payment card entrants, were able to introduce a new payment platform. More
than fifty years later, although shares of payments have shifted dramatically among them, all of these
platforms coexist.
This competition and its evolution are hard to reconcile with the simplest models of network
effects. In these models, a platform is more attractive the more participants it has, and these
demand-side scale economies propel markets to monopoly. In the early literature on direct network
effects, there was emphasis on the impact of certain events—including anticompetitive behavior—
on tipping markets to monopoly.19
One of the major contributions the multi-sided platform literature has made to industrial
organization has been to demonstrate that indirect network effects are important across a wide range
of industries—from low-tech industries such as shopping malls to high-tech ones such as mobile
phone operating systems. In simple models, indirect network effects can also produce demand-side
economies of scale that lead to monopoly: increased participation on one side of the platform makes
it more attractive to the other side, leading to increased participation there, making participation by
the first side more attractive, and so on.
But many of the industries in which indirect network effects are important do not have a single
monopoly provider and do not seem to be tending toward monopoly. For example, in the U.S., in
addition to several payment systems, there are several competing financial exchanges, numerous
magazines even in narrow categories such women’s fashion, multiple shopping malls that people in
metropolitan areas can patronize, several mobile phone operating systems used by consumers and
developers, numerous dating venues, and three general purpose search engines.
Two features missing from simple models help explain this apparent discrepancy. First,
19

Useful overviews of this literature are provided by Katz and Shapiro (1994) and Farrell and Klemperer (2006).
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competing platforms typically offer differentiated products. Second, in some settings customers on
one or more sides of the business can patronize more than one platform – a phenomenon that has
come to be called “multi-homing.”
Nevertheless, indirect network effects, like ordinary supply-side scale economies, do tend to
limit the number of viable multi-sided platforms in any market. Most multi-sided platforms thus face
a relatively small number of competitors as they seek to gain customers on all sides of their
businesses. Often, both static and dynamic competition are important in industries with multi-sided
platforms.
A.

PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION

The traditional concepts of product differentiation (see Tirole 1988, Chapter 7) for one-sided
firms apply to multi-sided platforms. There is variation across consumers both in the valuation of
various product attributes (horizontal differentiation) and in the willingness or ability to pay for
quality (vertical differentiation). Firms can select product attributes to appeal to particular groups of
consumers and to differentiate themselves from competitors.
For one-sided firms, horizontal and vertical differentiation locates the firm near a pool of
potential customers and helps determine pricing. For multi-sided platforms, by determining the
customers on one side, horizontal and vertical differentiation affect demand on the other sides.
Because of these interdependencies, a platform must usually make differentiation decisions jointly
for all of the sides it serves. Moreover, the selection of customers on one side is one possible way to
differentiate the platform horizontally or vertically.
A shopping mall developer, for example, must decide on a number of different product
attributes such as location, size, parking, and quality of construction. But it also needs to decide what
kind of stores and customers it wants to attract. Those are obviously interdependent. It could be an
upscale mall and only rent space to merchants with an upscale clientele. If it succeeds in attracting
enough such merchants it will tend to attract an upscale clientele. In order to do this, of course, it is
likely to make other decisions—such as locating close to wealthy towns and using better finishes—
that helps attract wealthy customers and merchants they tend to patronize.20
Product differentiation, as this example suggests, is a tactic that firms can use to create value by
making it easier for agents to find counterparties for value-increasing exchange. The upscale mall,
for example, makes it easier for shoppers to find stores that serve their tastes and easier for stores to
find customers. In some cases, platforms differentiate themselves by using what Evans (2012a),
following Strahilovetz (2006), has called the exclusionary vibe.21 The dating site, JDate, does not
prevent Gentiles from using it but engages in various actions that signal that it is primarily for Jewish
singles looking for other Jewish singles. Platforms can also create value for agents on one side by
20 Galeotti and Moraga-Gonzalez (2009) provide a model of a shopping mall that attracts horizontally differentiated
retailers as well as consumers. The analysis of Hagiu (2009) is also relevant.
21 For a discussion of the exclusionary vibe in the context of multi-sided platforms see Evans (2012a).
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limiting how much competition they face for a match, as observed by Halaburda and Piskorski
(2011).
Product differentiation is a key reason why many industries with multi-sided platforms have
multiple competitors even though indirect network effects and sometimes economies of scale would
seem to propel them to monopolies. Job placement provides an interesting example. The online
portion of this industry consists of job boards that help match job searchers with employers through
online postings and search. In the U.S. there are two large job boards that cover many different job
categories. But then there are hundreds of other job boards that specialize in different job segments
such as professionals (LinkedIn.com) and media jobs (mediabistro.com). By specializing, these job
boards presumably increase matching efficiency. Beyond the job boards there are recruiting services
that work for employers or employees. The result is a highly fragmented industry of two-sided
platforms.
B.

MULTI-HOMING

The competitive dynamics of multi-sided platforms depend in theory and in practice on the
number of platforms that individual economic agents on each side use, on differences between the
two sides in the number of platforms used, and on the ability of an agent on one side to dictate the
choice of platform for the other side.
Rochet and Tirole (2003) observed that one of the key competitive aspects of multi-sided
platforms was the extent to which economic agents engaged in what they called “single-homing” or
“multi-homing.” An economic agent single-homes if she uses only one platform in a particular
industry and multi-homes if she uses several. In the cases of payments, consumers and merchants
both generally use several payment platforms and therefore multi-home in this sense.
Armstrong (2006) showed the importance of “multi-homing” for competition. Suppose
platforms in some market create value by having agents of Type A and Type B as members. If Type
A agents only join one platform, then Type B agents can only gain access to Type A agents by
joining that same platform. That makes the Type A side of a platform what Armstrong called a
“competitive bottleneck.” When there is single homing on one side and multi-homing on the other
side in his model, Armstrong shows that platforms will compete aggressively for the single-homing
customer who will therefore pay low prices. With these customers on board the platform will then
earn its profits from the customers who multi-home on the other side.
Sometimes one set of multi-homing agents can dictate the choice of platform to agents on the
other side of the market. As we have noted, most consumers use multiple payment methods and
even use multiple payment cards, and most merchants accept all of the payment alternatives. One
can argue, however, that in practice the consumer dictates which payment system is used. The
consumer generally offers one particular payment method at checkout. The merchant then has to
decide whether to reject that payment method. If they do they might lose a sale. In addition, there
may be other reasons why the merchant cannot steer the consumer away from their chosen
method—laws against surcharging payment methods, restrictions imposed by the platform involved,
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customs relating to payment acceptance, or transaction costs. If the consumer decides then, by the
logic of competitive bottlenecks, the payment platforms have an incentive to compete aggressively
for the consumer to use their payment method. That is a possible explanation for providing
“rewards” for people to use cards. Bedre-Defolie and Calvano (2012) rely on this assumption in
showing that payment card systems have an incentive to subsidize card users at the expense of
merchants more than is socially optimal.
It is not clear how robust the “competitive bottleneck” argument is, however. In software
platforms, for instance, the price structure appears to be the opposite of what the competitive
bottlenecks theory would predict. Most personal computer users rely on a single software platform,
while most developers write for multiple platforms.22 Yet personal computer software providers
generally make their platforms available for free, or at low cost, to applications developers and earn
profits from the single-homing user side.
C.

ASYMMETRIC COMPETITION

The theoretical economics literature on multi-sided platforms has focused on two major cases:
monopoly platforms and competition among (possibly differentiated) multi-sided platforms that
serve the same customer groups. Many platforms in fact face more complicated competitive
environments as observed by Evans and Noel (2005) and Eisenman et al. (2011). An n-sided
platform can face competition from:
•

•

•

A single-sided firm on any side. We saw that 2-sided payment platforms face
competition from 1-sided store cards. The three-sided personal computer software
platforms competed at least initially with one-sided platforms such as the IBM
mainframe (the mainframe integrated an operating system and hardware and did not
encourage the development of general complementary applications.)
A multi-sided platform that competes on some but not all sides. The Android operating
system, for example, serves as a platform for handset manufacturers, users, mobile
operators, and software developers. The Apple iPhone operating system serves as a
platform for all of these except handset manufacturers, since Apple does not license its
operating system to other handset manufacturers.
A multi-sided platform that has the same sides plus additional ones. That is true for
Apple relative to Android. It is also true to a large degree for search platforms versus
social networking platforms. Both earn revenue from advertising, but social networking
platforms earn revenue from application developers—especially game developers.

Online advertising is an example of many platforms serving one side—advertisers—but
providing very different products to secure the attention of consumers. In China, for example, the
following platforms all sell online advertising to users but provide very different services to them:
22

Evans et al (2006).
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Tencent (instant messaging), Baidu (search engine), Sina (integrated portal), Qihoo (antivirus),
Netease (integrated portal), Taobao (online shopping), Sohu (integrated portal), Youku (online
video), Tudou (Online Video), Google (search engine), Tianya (community), Home of Websites (site
map), Ku6 (online video), Thunder Video (online video), and Phoenix (integrated portal). The
platforms intersect on the advertising side but deviate, at least in terms of the services offered, on
the user side.23 Of course they are all seeking attention from consumers which is what they are
providing to advertisers.
IV.

MARKET DEFINITION AND MARKET POWER

The fundamental service provided by multisided platforms is the ability of economic agents on
each side to interact in a valuable way with economic agents on other sides. The OpenTable
platform, for instance, makes it easier for consumers and restaurants to schedule a time to dine. A
platform may provide economic agents with various products and services to persuade them to use
the platform and help facilitate the process of searching, matching, and interacting. OpenTable
provides restaurants with table management and reservation software. It provide consumers with a
website that enables them to search for restaurants, see ratings, determine availability for particular
times and numbers of guests, and to make a reservation. But ultimately the platform is generating
value from bringing members of these two groups of customers together. The goods and services
provided to each side are usually the means to that end. OpenTable provided restaurants with a
suite of software services in part to get them to join its network and it provided consumers with a
suite of tools to get them to use its network. (It would be easy for consumers to multi-home; less
easy for restaurants.) These linkages across the multiple groups of customers and the products and
services being offered to these customers have to be accounted for in the analysis of the relevant
antitrust market and the assessment of market power.24
Market definition and market power analysis are primarily methods for succinctly summarizing
the extent to which competitive constraints limit the ability of a firm to engage in various kinds of
behavior that may raise antitrust concerns. Market definition identifies the sources of demand-side
and supply-side constraints that matter in assessing market power. Market power analysis assesses
whether these constraints prevent a firm from charging prices that are noticeably higher than under
competition or otherwise engaging in undesirable behavior that a competitive firm could not do
profitably. We therefore begin by considering differences between competitive constraints for multisided firms and those for single-sided firms.
A.

COMPETITIVE CONSTRAINTS
Indirect network effects result in three major considerations for the analysis of competitive

Evans (2012c).
For our general views on the proper analysis of market definition and market power in antitrust matters see
Chang et al (2011a, 2011b) and Evans (2012b).
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constraints.
First, the positive feedbacks between the sides need to be considered when analyzing the
profitability of increasing price. Consider a platform with sides A and B. An increase in price, or a
reduction in quality, to A-type customers will reduce the number of A’s that belong to the platform
and the extent to which they participate in it. Since B-type customers value the platform because of
their ability to access and interact with A-type customers, the demand by B’s will fall even if the
prices they face have remained the same. The result is that the demand by As will fall more since
the platform is less valuable to them now that it has fewer B’s. As noted by Armstrong (2006), the
demand on each side of the platform is more elastic, and the profitability of a price increase is lower,
when these positive feedback effects are considered than when they are not considered. In a study
of magazines, Song (2011) estimated that these effects doubled price elasticities. Of course, it is
possible that these feedback effects are small and could be ignored in any particular setting. But if
the subject of an antitrust inquiry is a multi-sided platform, one would at least need to inquire into
the strength of these feedback effects in assessing the profitability of raising prices on any side.
Second, the competitive constraints on raising price to one side, or engaging in any other
strategy, can come directly or indirectly from any and all sides of competing platforms. A platform
that considers raising its price, for example, has to consider the extent to which customers drop off
of one side; how that affects customer losses on other sides; the extent to which other platforms
pick up those customers; and how the addition of customers on each side of a competing platform
increases the value of that platform to the other sides through positive feedback effects. More
generally, platforms engaging in any strategy would need to consider counterstrategies on either side.
For example, if a platform attempts to engage in an exclusionary strategy on one side it is possible
that a rival could counter with strategies that involve that, the other, or both sides. It is, of course,
an empirical matter as to whether customers can turn to other platforms, as is the extent to which
the positive feedback effects require looking beyond competition between the similar sides of
alternative platforms.
Third, the existence of indirect network effects can also limit supply-side substitutability and
increase entry barriers for multi-sided platforms. Successful incumbent firms have by definition
obtained a critical mass of users on their several sides and benefit from the positive feedback effects
between these customer groups. Entrants have to obtain critical mass as well and that often takes
time. Moreover, in a mature market the entrant has the challenge of persuading users who may
benefit from these positive feedback effects to switch to a platform that has a smaller and therefore
possibly less valuable group of customers on the other side.25 In practice product differentiation and
25 In U.S. v. Microsoft the government argued that Microsoft had monopoly power in software operating systems
because among other things it was protected by an insurmountable “applications barrier to entry.” In the language of
multi-sided platforms, which had not yet emerged when that case was tried, Windows was a multi-sided platform serving
end users, developers who write applications, and hardware makers. All three are linked by indirect network
externalities. Windows had a critical mass of customers on all three sides, and each group had made investments in the
platform. The market power question is whether an entrant could have overcome these advantages and secured critical
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the possibilities of multi-homing are critical to the degree of difficulty faced by entrants.
B.

MARKET POWER

Market power is commonly defined as the ability of a firm (or group of firms) to raise prices
significantly above the competitive level, although there is no consensus on exactly how much above
the competitive level constitutes significant market power. The competitive level is generally taken to
be the price that would prevail under perfect competition, so that price is set at marginal cost.26
There are difficulties and nuances in analyzing market power in single-sided markets that we do not
address here.27 Instead we focus on how the existence of demand interdependencies affects
commonly used approaches to assessing market power.
Some models of multi-sided platforms, notably the Rochet-Tirole (2003) model discussed
above, may provide a theoretical rationale for comparing price and marginal cost by computing a
multi-sided version of the familiar Lerner Index. Similar measures can be computed even when they
lack a theoretical rationale, of course, but their interpretation in unclear in such cases. In general,
multi-sided price-cost margins face the same difficulties in interpretation as do the single-sided price
cost margins. Because competitive firms need to recover fixed costs, unless marginal cost is rising
and exceeds average variable coat, prices cannot be equal to marginal cost in competitive
equilibrium. Marginal cost is clearly not the right benchmark for software or internet-based
products for which marginal cost is typically negligible. And, as Chamberlin (1933) noted long ago,
competitive equilibrium in the presence of product differentiation necessarily involves prices above
marginal cost.
Market share is often used to assess market power for single-sided firms. The theoretical
justification for inferring market power from market share is weak for single-sided firms. It is no
stronger for multi-sided ones. In addition, it is not always clear how to compute “share” for multisided firms. Consider a software platform. One of the main “products” that software developers get
from the platform is access to users; one of the main “products” that users get is the access to
software developers. One could compare shares for each of these sides across platforms and then
make a judgment about market power based on looking at the shares for both sides, but there is no
reason to expect those shares to be equal.
In addition, multi-sided platforms often provide one of their products for free or at a subsidized
mass for the ignition, and generation of positive feedback effects, for an alternative platform. See United States vs.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Evans et al (2000). The answers to questions of this sort are likely to be
market-specific: Apple’s iPhone had an enormous stock of applications (or apps) before the first Android smartphone
was marketed, for instance, yet as this is written Android phones are substantially outselling iPhones.
26 Areeda and Hovenkamp (2002), Volume IIA, at ¶501; Motta (2004), at 115; Elhauge and Geradin (2007), at 238.
In the EU, dominance has also been defined as holding “a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking
which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers”. See Case
27/76, United Brands Company and United Brands Continental BV v. European Commission, 1978 E.C.R. (1978).
27 Chang et al (2011b).
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price. In these cases it is not possible to calculate a value-based market share, which is what is
ordinarily recommended, since the price does not in fact reflect the value received by the user. In
some cases there is a common metric for the multiple sides that provides a natural way to compute
share. For example, buyers and sellers both use payment systems to execute transactions, and one
could calculate shares based on the number or value of these transactions
Several authors have warned against basing judgments about market power on analysis of only a
single side of a multi-sided platform.28 As noted above, it is theoretically possible and empirically
common for platforms to have prices that are significantly above marginal cost on one side and at or
below marginal cost on the other side. A platform could have a monopoly in which it earns
significantly more than the competitive rate of return yet price at or below marginal cost on one
side. Therefore examining price on that side would result in a false negative test result for market
power. A platform could also earn a competitive rate of return yet price significantly above marginal
cost on one side. Therefore examining price on that side would result in a false positive test result
for market power. In principle an analyst could adjust these prices by assessing the marginal cost of
securing access to a customer on the other side, thereby lowering the effective margin for the highprice side and raising the effective margin for the low-price side. But this would not be a simple
exercise and would still face the same difficulties as single-sided price-cost margin analyses.
Profitability is also sometimes used to assess market power for single-sided firms. For multisided platforms the economic rate of return is an appealing measure of market power because it
assesses the extent to which the platform has been able, through setting prices for itse multiple sides,
to earn more than a competitive return. Rates of return vary over time, however, and it is well
known that measuring the economic rate of return and comparing it to the competitive rate of
return is challenging at best.29 The manner in which accounting data are collected and reported
makes accurate measurements and comparisons difficult, as does the problem of accounting for risk
and its compensation.
There is no single reliable method for assessing market power for traditional firms and it is
usually recommended that analysts consider multiple sources of evidence to reduce the chances of
false positives or false negatives. Exclusive reliance on mechanical measures such as market share or
price-cost margins in determining market power is not advisable. The same issues apply to multisided platforms but, as we have discussed, there are further problems. A thorough review of
competitive constraints is normally needed, and analysts need to make judgments based on multiple
sources of evidence on these constraints. In evaluating these constraints, it is important that the
analyst consider the role of interdependent demand as discussed above.
C.

MARKET DEFINITION
The purpose of market definition is to identify the competitive constraints on the supplier of the
28
29

Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007); Evans (2003); Song (2011); Weyl (2010); Wright (2004).
Fisher and McGowan (1983); Fisher (1987); Feenstra and Wang (2000).
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product under consideration – the market forces that reduce the profitability of raising prices above
competitive levels or lowering quality.30 As noted above, these constraints may be imposed by
single-sided firms on any side of the platform under consideration, other platforms that serve the
same customer groups, other platforms that serve some but not all of the same groups, or other
platforms that serve the same groups plus others. Although some of these may be unimportant in
particular instances, it is impossible to rule any of them out without investigation.31
The literature on multi-sided platforms has examined three issues related to market definition.
The first concerns the consequences of applying analytical tools that were developed for single-sided
firms to defining markets for a product offered on one side of a multi-sided platform. Evans and
Noel (2005, 2008) show that the failure to consider positive-feedback effects in demand can result in
significantly overstating or understating the breadth of the market, depending on the analytical
approach. Consider the simple hypothetical monopolist test.32 Suppose a small but significant, nontransitory price increase is profitable on one side under the assumption that nothing changes on the
other side of the platforms included in the hypothetical monopoly. Therefore one could conclude
that the products considered constitute a relevant antitrust market. However, as we have noted, a
price increase on one side results in a reduction of demand by customers for that side and, through
positive feedback effects, a reduction in the demand for the other side; the decline in demand on the
other side further reduces the demand on the first side. Consequently, one might conclude after
considering the positive feedback effects that the price increase is unprofitable. In that case the
market is defined too narrowly. One can identify other techniques, such as those involving critical
loss analysis, which when applied to a single side of a multi-sided platform would result in defining
markets too broadly. The key point is that it is wrong as a matter of economics to ignore significant
demand interdependencies among the multiple platform sides.33
The second issue concerns determining cases in which it is possible to easily adapt existing tools
for market definition to multi-sided platforms. A special case is when the two sides are tied together
30European Commission (1997), at 5; UK Office of Fair Trading (2004), at 3; U.S. Department of Justice an Federal
Trade Commission (2010), at 9-10.
31 Rysman (2009).
32 It starts with a hypothetical monopolist, which often consists of two firms that seek to merge. It then asks
whether this hypothetical monopolist could profitably increase price by a small but significant and non-transitory
amount above the current level. If the evidence implies that it could not, then there must be additional substitutes that
constrain its pricing. The test proceeds in principle by including substitutes in the hypothetical monopolist until one
obtains an aggregate that, if acting as a single firm, could profitably increase price, and that aggregate defines the relevant
market. See Kaplow (2013)
33 More generally, Evans and Noel (2008) show that there are two biases. It is possible to predict whether these
biases lead to too narrow or too broad a market in the cases where the platforms are symmetric in the sense that they
serve the same groups, face the same elasticities of demand, and have the same degree of positive feedback effects.
There is an estimation bias that results from estimating a demand system for the potential group of products that ignores
positive feedback effects. This bias leads to markets that are too narrow in the symmetric case. There is the Lerner bias
that results from using the single-sided price-cost mark up to estimate demand and then using this in a critical loss
formula. This would result in defining markets too broadly in the symmetric case. It is not generally possible to predict
the directions of the biases in the empirically more common case of asymmetric platforms.
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in a fixed proportion, as in the Rochet-Tirole (2003) model. It is then possible to define a
composite price that is equal to the sum of the prices that each customer side pays. The analyst can
in principle conduct the SSNIP, critical loss, and Lerner-type market power analysis using this
composite price. In the case of a critical loss analysis the Lerner-based elasticity of demand would be
based on the composite price and the composite marginal cost of providing the service to the two
sides, though the same concerns about these approaches in one-sided analyses would generally
apply. Emch and Thompson (2006) propose this approach to payment cards. The composite price
includes the fees charged to merchant acquirers for each transaction (a network fee plus an
interchange fee) and the fees charged to issuers for each transaction (a network fee minus the
interchange fee which they are paid). The U.S. Department of Justice adopted this approach in a
case involving payment cards.34 Many multi-sided platforms do not, however, provide services that
are consumed in fixed proportions by the multiple sides. For example, in the case of mobile
software platforms software developers are provided access to users while users are provided access
to applications.
The third area involves developing general tools that can be used for assessing market definition
for multi-sided platforms. These generally involve econometric models that explicitly account for
interdependencies in demand between the various platform sides. To date, these models have been
developed and deployed entirely in the context of mergers and primarily for newspapers. We
discuss them in the next section.
D.

MULTI-SIDED PLATFORM MARKETS

As the discussion above demonstrates, multi-sided platforms do not fit neatly into the standard
approaches for assessing market definition and market power. Moreover, extending these
approaches to deal with multi-sided platforms rigorously is technically and empirically challenging.
There is therefore a temptation on the part of analysts to do the best they can with standard tools,
particularly when a case is presented as dealing with only one side of a platform’s business—
magazine advertising rates, for instance. While ideal tools for dealing with many situations do not yet
exist, two basic limitations of standard tools must be dealt with to avoid serious errors.
First, the analysis needs to consider how positive feedback effects between demands on the
multiple sides affect competition on the side under examination. It is a fundamental mistake to
ignore these positive feedback effects, without at least first evaluating their significance, and
therefore conduct a market definition analysis that focuses on one side and in effect assumes the
other sides away. These features of the market could be considered in the market power prong of
the analysis but they must be considered somewhere.
Second, the analysis needs consider the welfare of all customer groups. When there are material
demand interdependencies the welfare of the customers on the multiple sides are inextricably
intertwined, and may move in opposite directions as price structures change. In an empirically34

Hesse and Soven (2006); U.S. vs. First Data Corp., No. 03-CV-02169 (D.D.C. May 25, 2004), Final Judgment.
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based simulation of hypothetical magazine mergers, for instance, Song (2011) found that mergers
would sometimes benefit subscribers and harm advertisers and sometimes would have the opposite
effects. In this case and in general, there is no compelling public policy rationale for ignoring the
welfare of any group of customers as an artifice of market definition that focuses only on one side.
Song’s (2011) analysis indicates that even if advertisers oppose a particular merger that would harm
them and present a compelling analysis of a “magazine advertising market,” it does not follow that
the merger is socially undesirable.
V.

MERGERS

The basic question in a merger inquiry concerns whether the proposed combination is likely to
decrease consumer or social welfare significantly after accounting for unilateral and coordinated
effects and efficiency.35 We first discuss some significant general issues that arise in the unilateral
effects analysis of mergers between multi-sided platforms in addition to those discussed above
concerning the analysis of market definition and market power.36 (We treat coordinated effects
generally in Section VII, below.) While the bulk of the economic literature on multi-sided platforms
has been theoretical, actual and potential mergers involving newspapers and magazines have been
subjected to a good deal of empirical analysis. The second part of this section provides a brief
overview of some recent empirical work on mergers of newspapers and magazines.
A.

PREDICTING UNILATERAL EFFECTS OF MULTI-SIDED PLATFORM MERGERS

There are four general points to be made here.
First, the “off-the-shelf” analytical tools for assessing unilateral effects from mergers between
one-sided firms are wrong insofar as they fail to account of interdependencies in demand among the
multiple sides. Unfortunately, the multi-sided extensions of the single-sided tools used for back-ofthe-envelope calculations of unilateral effects result in complex formulae that require estimates that
are not likely to be readily available to the analyst. For example, Affeldt et al (2012) show how the
UPP analysis introduced by Farrell and Shapiro (2010), and subsequently included in the 2011
Horizontal Merger Guidelines in the U.S., must be modified to account for indirect network effects
in analyzing mergers of two-sided platforms. The formulas become a good deal more complex
because a change in any one price affects all four quantities. To do a complete UPP analysis of a
merger between two two-sided platforms, six diversion ratios must be estimated. These necessarily
include estimates of indirect network effects. Similarly, Filistrucchi et al (2012) show how to
perform a two-sided SSNIP test: they estimate the profitability of a small but significant and nontransitory post-merger increase in either or both of a two-sided platform’s prices. This analysis
See Willig and Keating (2013) and Ordover (2013).
An early and important contribution to the literature on multi-sided platforms is Rysman (2004) which developed
and estimated a structural model of Yellow Pages. Subsequent papers that have used a similar framework to analyze
mergers of multi-sided platforms have included Affeldt et al (2012); Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009); Filistrucchi et al
(2012); Jeziorski (2012); and Song (2011).
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requires a complete structural model of the firms’ demands, including both cross-price effects and
indirect network effects, a good deal more information than is necessary in the case of ordinary
single-sided firms.
Second, in some cases it is at least theoretically possible for a merger of two-sided firms to result
in price reductions to both sides even in the absence of efficiency gains. In the Chandra and
Collard-Wexler (2009) model of a two-newspaper market, the main initial effect of a merger is that if
a price increase of one paper causes a reader so switch papers, she is not lost to the merged firm.
The way the model is set up, the first reader to switch away in response to a price increase is always
the least profitable for that paper. In fact, both newspapers, which are assumed unable to price
discriminate, could well be losing money on their marginal readers at their optimal pre-merger
prices. At those prices, by definition, a tiny increase in either paper’s per-copy price would leave its
profits unchanged. (That is, the derivative of each paper’s profits with respect the per-copy price is
zero.) Suppose at its optimal pre-merger price paper A is losing money on its marginal reader. Postmerger, a tiny increase in its price would lower the profits of the merged firm, since the unprofitable
marginal reader would switch to the firm’s other paper, thus lowering its profits. (That is, the
derivative of the merged firm’s profit with respect to the per-copy price of paper A is negative at the
optimal pre-merger prices.) If a small increase in either paper’s price would reduce the merged
firm’s profit, it follows that a small decrease in subscription prices at both papers would increase
profits. Because consumers’ propensity to subscribe to either paper is assumed to be correlated with
their attractiveness to advertisers at that paper, these price cuts bring in subscribers who lower the
average attractiveness to advertisers, thus also making a lower per-subscriber advertising rate
optimal.
As this discussion indicates, the possibility of this particular result depends on a number of
special assumptions, and even then whether prices go up or down depends on the values of
particular parameters in the model. This model is certainly not generally applicable. But it remains
to be seen whether the possibility to which it points—a platform merger lowering profit-maximizing
prices to both sides even without efficiency gains—is also present in other models that are
descriptive of other market settings. In the absence of further study, one must conclude that it
appears possible that some mergers of multi-sided firms can lead to price cuts on all sides of the
market even in the absence of efficiency gains—something that is simply impossible for mergers of
single-sided firms. Although this possibility may turn out to be a very rare occurrence, its existence
emphasizes once more that analysts need to consider the multi-sided aspects of mergers carefully
and avoid mechanical analysis of multi-sided mergers with traditional one-sided tools.
Third, all else equal merger of multi-sided platforms would ordinarily increase indirect network
externalities by increasing the size of all customer groups and thereby provide offsetting efficiency
benefits.37 There is no similar presumption in the case of mergers of single-sided firms. To evaluate
We want to emphasize that we are not advocating a lighter standard of review for multi-sided platform mergers or
any presumption that such mergers are procompetitive.
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the impact of the merger on consumer (or social) welfare analysts need to assess the value of these
externalities. It is particularly important to do so since prices could increase to consumers on one or
more side while the value consumers are receiving on that side has increased even more as a result
of positive externalities.
Fourth, to evaluate the impact of a merger of multisided platforms on consumer (or social)
welfare it is necessary to consider the impact of all sides. A merger could benefit consumers on one
side but harm those on the other side and the net effect of the merger across all customer groups
could therefore be positive or negative. Suppose, for instance, that Open Table proposed a merger
with a competitor and that it is determined that the merged firm would likely increase prices to
restaurants. It does not follow that the merger is undesirable, however. Restaurants would likely
have access to more consumers, and that might more than make up for the price increase. And if
restaurants single-home and the merged firm does not take the radical step of charging consumers to
make reservation, consumers are clearly better off: they still face a zero price and can access more
restaurants on a single platform.
B.

NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINE MERGERS

Newspapers and magazines are two-sided platforms. They provide news and entertainment to
readers and sell space on their pages to advertisers who want to reach those readers. They solve a
usage externality by providing a mechanism to bring a possible buyer and seller together; they pay
the reader to come by providing content, often at a subscription price below marginal cost, and they
give the advertiser access to that reader. They also generate positive externalities for advertisers;
advertisers value newspaper with more readers.38 Readers could like or dislike advertising. The
evidence from studies so far indicates that overall advertising does not generate positive or negative
externalities for readers.39

Economists have recently developed formal models of advertising-supported media that explicitly recognize that
they are multi-sided platforms. Most of the models to date are based on the assumption that consumers rely on a single
platform and that the only way for advertisers to reach a consumer is to advertise on the platform that has a monopoly
on that person. That assumption departs significantly from reality. Consumers obtain content from multiple advertising
platforms. Advertisers consider these alternatives partly as substitutes in deciding how to allocate their advertising
budgets; they also consider these alternatives as complements when they want to reinforce messages in different ways
through different media. Unfortunately, many key results of most models depend on that assumption. For example,
many papers conclude that platforms charge a monopoly price for advertising (since they each have a monopoly over
access to some consumers) and that competition among platforms tends to increase advertising prices (because
platforms that have less advertising can attract more consumers). See Anderson and Coate (2005); Calvano and Jullien
(2012); and Reisinger (2012). Athey, Calvano, and Gans (2012) develop a model that assumes that some people use one
platform while others stochastically search the web. They show that under this more realistic assumption the results of
the earlier models are reversed
39 See Argentesi and Filistruchhi (2007), Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009), Fan (forthcoming), and Song (2011).
Note that these results average across different types of advertising in newspapers. We suspect that consumers generally
value classified listings—a service that consumers often seek out offline and online—while they may not value display
advertising mixed with news and entertainment content.
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Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009) conduct a reduced-form examination of the effects of the
consolidation of the Canadian newspaper industry in the late 1990s on prices charged to consumers
and to advertisers. They find no evidence that mergers led to increases in either price, contrary to
expectations derived from one-sided models, and they interpret this as consistent with their
theoretical model discussed above.
Several authors have evaluated the effect of newspaper and magazine mergers on prices and
welfare by developing and estimating structural models of these platforms that account for the
possible demand interdependencies between the two sides. Both Affeldt et al (2012) and Filistrucchi
et al (2012) use detailed econometric models of the Dutch newspaper market, and they study how
taking account of two-sidedness affects the evaluation of hypothetical mergers. Affeldt et al (2012)
find that when two-sidedness is ignored, the estimate of upward pricing pressure on advertising is
essentially zero, while they find substantial upward pressure on advertising rates when account is
taken of two-sidedness. Filistrucchi et al (2012) find similar results with a SSNIP test and a full
simulation of the post-merger equilibrium: taking into account two-sidedness reveals potential
unilateral effects on the advertising side that do not show up in analysis that ignores indirect
network effects.
Fan (forthcoming) develops a structural model of newspapers that considers the value of
characteristics to readers and advertisers and the possibility that the owners could change these
characteristics following a merger. She estimates the model for newspapers in Minneapolis and finds
that a hypothetical merger increases subscription prices, lowers the quality of content from the
readers’ perspectives, reduces circulation, and lowers the value that advertisers receive. Given that
multisided platform businesses typically offer a variety of services to attract economic agents to the
platform, analyses such as Fan’s that consider the impact of mergers on non-price dimensions are
likely to prove important in practice.
Finally, Song (2011) estimates a structural model of German TV magazines that ignores twosidedness and one that takes it into account. He simulates a merger to monopoly in this market and
concludes that this drastic merger would be much less harmful than an analysis that ignores twosidedness would conclude. For many magazines he estimates that the merged firm would lower the
per-copy price, making consumers better off. While advertising rates would generally increase, the
greater circulation induced by lower per-copy prices would generally make advertisers better off as
well on balance.
C.

SOME PRACTICAL GUIDANCE

Analysts face a quandary in examining mergers of multi-sided platforms. The literature
discussed above indicates that standard back-of-the envelope calculations may give highly misleading
results for the merger of platforms that have significant interdependencies in demand between
customer groups. At least at this point the analogous formulas for multi-sided platforms require
more information than an analyst could easily obtain for an initial screening exercise. They
essentially require the estimation of a structural econometric model. But if such a model can be
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estimated, the analyst should just use that model to estimate the unilateral effects of the merger. Of
course, in practice, the data necessary for estimating structural models are rarely available, the
estimated models may not be robust, and it may take too much time to collect the data and estimate
structural models even when this is feasible.
Nevertheless, the best has never been the enemy of the good in merger analysis, and it need not
be just because multi-sided platforms are involved. The important point is to recognize the
economic structure of these platforms, especially the role of competitive constraints and demandside efficiencies, and factor that into the overall judgment concerning the merger. In some cases, it
may be possible to analyze unilateral effects on each side using traditional tools but factoring in
biases that have been identified in the literature. What analysts should not do is commit the classic
drunk’s mistake—looking under the streetlight for his lost keys just because the light is better
there—by conducting a standard one-sided analysis just because it is easier.
VI.

EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT

Economists have developed a variety of models that help analyze whether particular business
practices are likely to harm consumers as a result of excluding competitors from the market or
benefit consumers by reducing prices or increasing quality. These models are typically based on a
variety of assumptions that may or may not apply in any specific market. It is well known that many
of these models are sensitive to these assumptions. Results change when assumptions change.40
Most of the theoretical models on which antitrust analysis relies assume, explicitly or implicitly,
that the businesses considered are single-sided. They therefore are not obviously applicable to
situations in which firms serve multiple customers with interdependent demands. Moreover, given
the sensitivity of many of these models to the specific assumptions on which they rest, there is no
basis for assuming that the results of models built for competition among single-sided businesses
would apply to competition among multi-sided businesses. The only way to know for sure is to do
the math.
A relatively small number of authors have extended models originally developed to study
business practices by one-sided firms to consider the effects of those practices or similar ones when
engaged in by multi-sided platforms. We provide an overview of some of this work in this section.
It is important to note at the outset that the papers we discuss are more likely to be the first words
on the issues they address than the last words. Much more work remains to be done.
Overall, while the results of these multi-sided models are also sensitive to assumptions, the work
to date shows, generally, that one-sided results do not apply to multi-sided firms. The point is not
that multi-sided firms cannot or do not engage in anticompetitive practices. They could, in fact,
engage in very different anticompetitive practices, not even known or understood yet, than singlesided firms. Unfortunately, the work economists have done on single-sided firms does not provide
40

Evans and Padilla (2005).
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much guidance for evaluating the conduct of multi-sided firms.
A.

CRITICAL MASS AND PLATFORM VIABILITY

Multi-sided platforms may attempt to use exclusionary practices to deter platform entry. To see
why, we introduce the concept of critical mass and its role in launching a platform business as
developed in Evans (2010) and Evans and Schmalensee (2010). Consider a new B2B exchange for a
particular group of heterogeneous commodities. To provide value to buyers it must have sellers and
to provide value to sellers it must have buyers. And it must have enough of both to be viable, since
the likelihood of any buyer or seller finding a mutually advantageous trade increases with the
number of potential trading partners.
This leads to the well-known issue of liquidity in trading environments.41 A trading venue is only
viable if there is a sufficient volume of bids and asks for trading to occur and therefore for both
liquidity providers and liquidity takers to incur the expense of coming to the trading platform. If
there is too little liquidity buyers and sellers will not come to the platform. It there is enough
liquidity more buyers and sellers will come and the platform will in fact grow and the platform will
be attractive to market specialists and other liquidity providers. But if there are not enough buyers
and sellers, the market will not be attractive to liquidity providers. Critical mass refers to the
minimal level of demand that platforms must have on their various sides. Platforms that reach that
level are viable and positioned to grow more through positive feedback effects. Platforms that fall
short of that level are not viable. In some industries, the level of critical mass may be small portion
of the overall market. For example, Discover appears to be a viable U.S. payment card system even
though it has only about a 3.2 percent share of transaction volume.42
When platforms are conceived they, of course, do not have any customers on any side. The
challenge for a new platform is to reach critical mass. In some cases, this involves a sequential
process of building up demand on one side and then attracting the other side, perhaps a la the
“divide and conquer” pricing strategies discussed by Jullien (2011). For example, a media property
can invest in building up an audience and then when it gets enough people making that audience
available to advertisers. In other cases the platform must have both sides on board at the beginning
to have any value. That, for example, is clearly the case for matchmaking platforms such as
exchanges and dating venues. In this case, startups encourage early adopters and other people on
both sides that are willing to join the platform in the anticipation that it will achieve critical mass.
Strategies that prevent platform entrants from gaining critical mass or that push platforms
below critical mass can therefore exclude competitors and preserve the market for the predator.
The usual array of exclusionary tactics may be employed, including exclusive dealing, tying and
bundling, and predatory pricing. For such practices to be successful, they would need to be effective
Harris (2003); O’Hara (1995); Pagano (1989).
Nilson Report No. 988, February 2012, at 8. Note, however, that the Discover Card is accepted a most
merchants that accept cards in the U.S. See “Discover Striving to Raise U.S. Merchants’ Awareness of Card-Acceptance
Abilities,” PaymentsSource, April 21, 2010. http://www. paymentssource.com/news/-3001446-1.html.
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against the divide and conquer and other entry strategies available to competing platforms.
The existence of interdependent demands, however, also provides rationales for why these
strategies could increase consumer welfare even though they discourage entry. Putting congestion
effects aside, when there are positive feedback effects between the multiple platform sides, increases
in the demand on each side increases the value that the platform can deliver overall. Therefore
tactics such as requiring customers on one side to consolidate their demand on the platform—e.g.
exclusive dealing—can benefit not only those customers but also the customers on the other side.
These tactics can therefore increase consumer surplus.43 Not surprisingly, as the remainder of this
section demonstrates, depending on the assumptions made, the theoretical models of exclusionary
strategies show that these strategies can increase consumer welfare, decrease consumer welfare, or
have an uncertain effect on consumer welfare.
B.

EXCLUSIVE DEALING

The Dallas Morning News and the Dallas Times Herald were competing newspapers in Dallas,
Texas. They both obtained content such as columns and comic strips from the Universal Press
Syndicate. In August 1989 the Morning News signed an exclusive contract with Universal. The Times
Herald subsequently lost readership. It filed an antitrust case, and lost.44 In 1991, the parent
company of the Morning News bought the Times Herald and shut it down. Chowdury and Martin
(2010) use this example to motivate their analysis of exclusionary contracts that deny platform rivals
access to a key complementary input. They show that if consumers do not have strong preferences
for one paper over the other and if fixed costs are substantial, social welfare may be higher in the
post-contract, monopoly equilibrium, though consumers are always worse off.
In the presence of economies of scale, Segal and Whinston (2000) have demonstrated that an
incumbent monopoly can profitably deter the entry of a more efficient rival by persuading sufficient
customers to sign exclusive dealing contracts before the entrant appears. Doganoglu and Wright
(2010) investigate the effectiveness of this strategy when there are no economies of scale but
network effects are present. In the two-sided case, they find that it is profitable for the incumbent
to exclude a more efficient entrant by offering attractive exclusive dealing contracts to one side of
the market before the entrant appears and then charging high prices to those on the other side. As
in the single-sided case with scale economies, entry is deterred by making it impossible for the
potential entrant to obtain sufficient customers to be viable. With indirect network effects, locking
up either side of the market will make it impossible for an entrant to obtain customers on the other
side.
In an empirical study of the video game industry, Lee (2012) finds that exclusive contracts can
facilitate entry rather than deter it. Video game console platforms serve as intermediaries between
Prices could go up as a result of the value being provided by the platform increasing. Consumer welfare would
increase so long as the value increases by more than the price.
44 Times Herald Printing Co. vs. A.H. Belo Corp, No. A14-90-00856-CV (Texas App. – Houston [14th Dist.]
November 27, 1991).
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people who play games and developers that create games. The platform consists of hardware and
software that developers can use for writing games and that people then use for playing those
games. Developers have a greater incentive to write games for consoles that have more users who
are likely to license those games and users are more interested in buying consoles that have games
they want to play. Video game console makers have a timing issue as discussed by Haigu (2006). It
takes time to develop games. Therefore when a new console maker enters (such as Xbox did in
2001) or Sony creates a new version of its console (as it did with the PlayStation 2 and 3 in 2000 and
2006) it has to persuade developers to write games for that console without knowing the demand for
it.
Video console providers sometimes write their own games, which become exclusive to them,
and sometimes enter into contracts with game providers to develop games exclusively for their
console. These practices reduce the availability of games to consumers who have purchased other
consoles. However, Lee (2012) finds that in the case of sixth-generation video consoles, exclusive
dealing facilitated entry. In the absence of exclusivity, game developers would write games first for
the incumbent platform because of its larger user base. Only later, if at all, would they port those
games to entrants. Thus the entrants would be unable to match the incumbent’s array of games and
would find it difficult to differentiate themselves in a positive way. With exclusivity, however,
entrants can offer games that the incumbent cannot, thus enabling them to differentiate themselves.
Lee’s result is not inconsistent with the theoretical analysis of Doganoglu and Wright (2010), since
exclusive contracts by the incumbent that prevented entrants from getting access to popular games
could exclude entrants and harm consumer welfare.
That does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that exclusive dealing is procompetitive for
entrants and anticompetitive for incumbents. The entrant could be a significant multi-sided platform
business as Microsoft was when it used exclusive contracts to enter the browser business in
competition with the dominant incumbent Netscape and the video-game console business in
competition with the dominant incumbent Sony PlayStation. In evaluating exclusive dealing
contracts used by multi-sided platform entrants and incumbents, analysts would need to consider the
context in which those contracts are being entered into—in particular whether they are part of a
plausible anticompetitive strategy by either the entrant or the incumbent—and their procompetitive
effects in achieving or maintaining critical mass.
C.

TYING AND BUNDLING

In a classic paper, Whinston (1990) showed that in the presence of scale economies in the
market for good B, a monopoly seller of good A would under some conditions find it profitable to
employ tying contracts to become a monopolist in the B market. He showed that whether or not
this reduces social welfare depends on the details of the situation. Does this one-sided analysis apply
to multi-sided firms? As usual, adding sides adds a layer of complexity.
Amelio and Julien (2012) consider a two-sided case in which tying is both profitable and welfareincreasing. Suppose the profit-maximizing price on one side of the business is negative, but it is not
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feasible actually to charge a negative price. (One could argue that OpenTable must have faced this
problem, since, as noted above, it effectively charges a negative price to consumers by providing
rewards for usage.) By bundling another good or service, however, it is possible to make the
effective price on that side negative. They show that this practice increases consumer welfare in the
monopoly case but that it may not do so if there is competition.
Rochet and Tirole (2008) also model a situation in which tying increases social welfare. They
consider two competing platforms: A, which offers both credit and debit cards, and B, which offers
only a debit card. In their simplest model, allowing A to tie its two cards on the merchant side of
the business, so they must accept either both cards or neither card (the so-called “honor-all-cards”
rule), increases social welfare. Tying allows A to rebalance its pricing by raising the interchange fee
on debit above the competitive level and lowering the interchange fee on credit. While this is always
welfare-enhancing in their simplest model, in more complex models the net effect of tying on
welfare is ambiguous.
Choi (2010) presents a model designed to shed light on the effects of including Microsoft’s
Windows Media Player with Windows, which was the subject of an antitrust case in Europe.45 This
involves tying two platforms together—an operating system (which connects computer users and
application providers) and a streaming media software application (which connects computer users
and content providers), though Choi does not model the multi-sided aspects of Windows. In this
model two platforms, A and B, link content providers to consumers, and A also produces a product
M, which must be purchased in order to use either A or B. He assumes that content providers
multi-home. If consumers single-home, tying A to M will exclude B but may increase welfare if
network effects are strong (so there is a large efficiency gain from having more customers on both
sides of A) and consumers do not consider A and B to be very different (so the reduction in variety
from eliminating B is small). If consumers multi-home, however, tying A to M does not exclude B
(there are no economies of scale), and social welfare is unambiguously increased. This analysis
makes clear the importance of understanding where multi-homing occurs and, if it is not observed,
why it does not occur.
When products are consumed in fixed proportions, as in the Choi (2010) model, tying is
equivalent to pure bundling – selling only bundles of the two products involved. Chao and
Derdenger (2012) investigate mixed bundling – selling the products individually and (at a discount)
in a bundle. Consider a monopoly video game platform that is considering a mixed bundling
strategy: offering a bundle consisting of a console and some games as well as selling the console
alone and allowing video game developers to sell games by themselves. Ignoring indirect network
effects, one would expect that the optimal mixed bundling strategy would have higher prices for
both the console and games when sold separately than would be optimal if the bundle were not
European Commission, Decision of 24 May 2004 Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to Article 82 of the EC
Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement Against Microsoft Corporation (Case COM/C-3/37.792 – Microsoft),
Official Journal L 032, 06/02.2007 P. 0023-0028; Ahlborn and Evans (2009).
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offered, since the bundle enables the firm to segment the market according to the number of games
buyers prefer to consume. Chao and Derdenger (2012) present a model in which network effects
make it is optimal to reduce both console and game prices if a bundle is offered. Mixed bundling
here acts as a price discrimination device, as in one-sided models, and the presence of the bundle
reduces the cost of cutting console and game prices in order to encourage participation by both
consumers and developers. Chao and Derdenger (2012) present an empirical analysis of video game
pricing that reaches conclusions consistent with their theoretical model.
D.

PREDATORY PRICING

The general concerns about predatory pricing are as applicable for multi-sided platforms as they
are for single-sided firms. A platform could try to drive rivals out of business by lowering price to
one or several of the groups it serves. That could involve increasing subsidies on one side by
providing more or better free products and services. After driving a rival out of business the
platform, like a single-sided firm, could raise prices and reduce subsidies thereby recouping its losses.
As with the traditional story, one benefit of engaging in this strategy could be developing a
reputation for being a ruthless competitor thereby discouraging entry or competition in multi-market
settings.46 One should recognize, however, that successful predation may be extremely difficult and
unlikely, as it is in single-sided markets, given that it would entail certain up front losses from pricing
below cost in pursuit of uncertain future gains from driving and keeping competitors out of the
market.
The difference is that standard cost-based tests for detecting predatory pricing make no
economic sense for a multi-sided business. Those tests are motivated by the standard theoretical
result that profit-maximizing prices are never below marginal cost. But for multi-sided platforms, as
a matter of theory, the profit-maximizing price to one or more sides (though not, of course, to all)
could be lower than marginal cost—or any other measure of per-unit cost. Indeed, as we have
noted, many multi-sided platforms normally charge prices that are less than marginal cost and often
zero or even negative on at least one side.
The flip side of this problem is that a platform could engage in predatory pricing by maintaining
a low price on the “subsidy” side (readers for newspapers) and lower the price on the “money” side
(advertisers for newspapers) so much that the platform overall loses money. Of course, in theory it
would be possible to determine whether the platform has adopted an unprofitable set of prices, but
in practice that would be a more complex analysis than comparing prices and some measure of perunit cost as is standard for single-sided firms.
The important point is that the fact a multi-sided platform is providing goods or services to one
of the groups it serves at prices that do not recover costs provides no meaningful evidence that the
platform is engaging in predatory pricing. On the other hand, a change in pricing policy by a multisided platform that results in an overall lowering of prices to loss-inducing levels and that is not
46
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explained by other changes in the market could provide an indication of a possible abuse. As for
single-sided businesses, one must go beyond analysis of pricing before concluding that predation has
actually occurred.47
It is also important to note that there may be procompetitive explanations for a change in
pricing policies for multi-sided platforms that result from interdependent demands and that would
not ordinarily be considered for one-sided firms. For example, in examining allegations that The
Times of London engaged in predatory pricing Behringer and Filistrucchi (2011) argue that there is
evidence that The Times lowered subscription prices sharply because it recognized that advertising
prices, and therefore the value of readers, were increasing. It was then profitable to reduce
subscription prices to increase readership so as to be more valuable to advertisers. These authors
suggest that perhaps The Times recognized this before its rivals and therefore lowered its prices
earlier than they did.
Predatory pricing strategies could also exploit the role of interdependent demands and critical
mass for platforms. By charging unprofitably low prices (including providing subsidies in kind) a
platform could make it difficult for a rival that cannot match these low prices (or subsidies in kind)
to obtain a critical mass of customers. For example, suppose an incumbent platform faces
competition from a venture-backed startup. To prevent the startup from getting enough critical
mass to ignite its platform the incumbent could increase the content offering it is giving customers
for free on one side of its platform. Assuming the startup is liquidity constrained, that could prevent
the launch of its platform.48
E.

EFFICIENCIES

When it comes to considering efficiencies the main novelty for multi-sided platforms arises from
the fact that platforms serve multiple groups of customers with interdependent demand. Business
practices can increase the overall value of the platform both to its owners and to society in a variety
of ways. By increasing demand on one side, a platform can increase its value to agents on other sides
through indirect network externalities. This is a real social benefit, and the platform is unlikely to be
able to capture it all. In addition, Evans (2012a) shows how platforms develop governance systems
to reduce bad behavior by platform participants that could reduce the platform’s value. The ability
to exclude customers is central to the rules platforms use for this purpose. More generally, Boudreau
and Hagiu (2009) discuss the use of platform regulations to increase positive externalities and
decrease negative ones. In other cases, business process innovations might increase the efficiency of
a platform by providing better and cheaper matches between members of the various sides.
As a general matter a platform could increase consumer welfare overall if it increased the value it
delivered by more than it increased the prices it charged. It is possible, however, that change in
See the chapter on predatory pricing in this volume, Elzinga and Mills (2013).
Of course, it is well known that predatory pricing strategies generally face a number of challenges, and these
challenges also apply to multi-sided firms. Easterbrook (1981); Carlton and Perloff (2005), at 352-360.
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platform prices and products benefit customers on some sides while making customers on other
sides worse off. In evaluating such changes, there is no economic reason why one would focus on
losses to one group of consumers and ignore gains by another group. Economists are normally
interested in overall consumer welfare. A court or competition authority could erroneously
conclude, however, that a business practices harms consumers by analyzing competitive effects in a
narrow market that excludes one or more sides of a platform.49 That is a fundamental mistake;
correct analysis of multi-sided platforms always considers all groups served by the platform.
VII.

COORDINATED BEHAVIOR

Two major issues arise in the analysis of coordinated behavior for multisided platforms.
First, the welfare analysis of price fixing becomes more complex. When competing single-sided
firms collude on prices, economic theory predicts that they will generally raise prices, reduce output,
and reduce consumer and total welfare.50 The theory of multi-sided platforms yields much less clear
predictions. It is possible that competing platforms have adopted prices that are too low on one
side and too high on another. That is, there is no guarantee that competition will result in platforms
adopting the pricing structure that maximizes consumer welfare. It is therefore possible that a
coalition of platforms could fix prices—raising them on one side and lowering them on another—
that increases consumer welfare.
Several papers have reached this conclusion directly or indirectly. The analysis of payment card
systems’ “honor-all-cards” rule by Rochet and Tirole (2008) points in this direction. In their model
that rule has the effect of reducing competition between debit cards, permitting a rebalancing of
interchange fees that is socially beneficial under some conditions. Chandra and Collard-Wexler
(2009), discussed above in the context of mergers, finds that a merger of two newspapers could
result in an increase of consumer welfare as a matter of theory and finds support for this possibility
based on Canadian newspaper data. An agreement between competing newspapers to fix prices
would accomplish the same result as a merger. Fan (forthcoming), however, reaches the opposite
conclusion using a different model and an empirical study of U.S. newspapers. Similarly, in a model
that considers differentiation of newspapers along political lines, Antonielli and Fillistruchi (2012)
find that competition on pricing and political positioning creates greater consumer welfare than
49 Payment card networks have rules that merchants that have agreed to accept a card brand cannot surcharge
consumers for using that brand or selectively refuse to accept cards with that brand. Competition authorities and private
litigants have challenged these rules under various theories including tying. In these cases, the competition authorities
and courts have focused primarily on the merchant side of the payment platforms and ignored the benefits on the
consumer side. Our point is not that these practices are necessarily pro-competitive but that the correct analysis needs to
consider the welfare of customers on both sides of the platforms. See In Re Payment Card Interchange Fee and
Merchant-Discount Antitrust Litigation, No. 05-MD-1720-JG-JO (E.D.N.Y. February 20, 2009), First Amended
Supplemental Class Action Complaint; U.S. vs. American Express Co., No. 10-CV-04496-NG-CLP (E.D.N.Y. October
4, 2010), Complaint.
50 The rare case of firms with substantial market power selling complements provides an exception; see Rey and
Verge (2008).
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collusion. But they also find that Joint Operating agreements, a device used in the U.S. that allows
newspapers to collaborate on pricing and production but compete on the editorial side results in
lower consumer welfare than allowing newspapers to collaborate on all aspects of their business.
The second issue is that the existence of inter-linked prices raises the question of whether
collusion is harder or easier for platforms than for single-sided firms. Clearly the need to agree on
multiple prices makes platform-wide collusion harder, all else equal. Moreover, even ignoring this
issue Ruhmer (2011) presents a two-platform model with single-homing in which stronger indirect
network effects increase the gains from price-cutting and thereby make collusion harder to sustain.
This result suggests that in analyzing proposed mergers of multi-sided firms, enforcement agencies
might be less concerned about collusion than in mergers of single-sided firms, but it is not clear that
a significant difference can be rationalized unless indirect network effects are very strong indeed.
Ruhmer (2011) also addresses the question of whether multi-sided platforms can increase profits
by colluding on only some of the prices they charge. Evans and Schmalensee (2007a) argued that
intense competition on one side between two-sided platforms could eliminate the profitability of
collusion on the price charged on the other side. In Ruhmer’s (2011) model, where the two
platforms are imperfect substitutes for consumers and competition is not particularly intense, it is
possible for firms to profitably collude on prices on only one side. The profitability of such
incomplete collusion thus depends on the intensity of competition on the non-collusive side.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

As economists, we find the rapidly expanding literature on multi-sided markets interesting and
exciting. It is interesting both because of its technical complexity and because of the growing
economic importance of multi-sided platforms. It is exciting because it reveals patterns of behavior
and market outcomes that cannot arise with ordinary single-sided firms. As students of antitrust
policy, however, we look as this expanding area with some trepidation.
As this chapter has indicated, correct economic analyses of multi-sided platforms are more
complicated than correct analyses of single-sided firms. Moreover, the relevant theory, at least in its
current stage of development, yields fewer clear predictions, and there is relatively little empirical
work from which one can draw general lessons. Thus it does not now seem possible to come up
with many guidelines that can be used to structure rule of reason inquiries, let alone sharp lines that
would justify per se rules.
But the world and the economic literature are what they are, to paraphrase a successful
professional football coach. Multi-sided platforms are more complicated than single-sided firms.
Analysis or policy rules that ignore this complexity are prone to commit serious errors. Just because
the economic literature on multi-sided platforms does not have simple extensions of existing singlesided tools does not provide a license to apply the wrong tools to multi-sided platform issues.
In the meantime, we can provide some bits of general guidance. Perhaps the most important is
to consider all sides carefully and to understand the indirect network effects that link them.
Understanding that newspapers are two-sided platforms does not make analysis of them simple. But
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it does serve to structure the analysis in sound and sensible ways. Understanding that OpenTable is
a two-sided platform leads the way to understanding how giving away services to consumers could
be profit maximizing, not predatory. Recognizing that there are multiple customer groups with
interlinked demand may help competition policy analysis identify anticompetitive strategies and
identify possible efficiencies that would not be apparent from applying a traditional analysis. Finally,
recognizing these multiple customer groups is critical for ensuring that antitrust enforcement does
not have the unintended consequence of reducing consumer welfare by causing more harm on one
or more sides of a platform than it provides benefit on another side.
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